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Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White:
Retaliation Clarified
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s antidiscrimination
provision proscribes employment discrimination based on “race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”1 Its antiretaliation provision proscribes
“discriminat[ion] against . . . employees or applicants for employment”
because they have “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in [a Title VII] investigation, proceeding, or hearing.”2 In
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the Supreme Court stated that
“Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment
policies and effective grievance mechanisms.”3 A primary purpose of
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is “[m]aintaining unfettered access to
statutory remedial mechanisms.”4 It seeks to accomplish this objective
“by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an
employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of [Title VII’s]
basic guarantees.”5 In other words, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision
seeks to “prevent employers from engaging in retaliatory measures that
dissuade employees from engaging in protected conduct.”6
B. Circuit Split
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, the scope of Title VII’s antiretaliation
provision was the subject of considerable disagreement between the
circuits. They reasoned differently about whether the challenged
retaliatory action had to be employment or workplace related and about
how harmful the retaliatory action had to be to amount to retaliation.7 In
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
§ 2000e-3(a).
524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412 (2006).
Id. at 2420 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2406.
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Burlington, the Supreme Court resolved the dispute.
C. Burlington: The Facts
Sheila White (“White”) was the only woman working in Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company’s (“Burlington’s”) Maintenance
of Way department in its Memphis, Tennessee yard.8 Although White
was hired as a “track laborer,” a position that involved “removing and
replacing track components, transporting track material, cutting brush,
and clearing litter and cargo spillage from the right-of-way,” her primary
responsibility was operating the company forklift.9
In September 1997, White complained to Burlington officials that
her immediate supervisor had made inappropriate and insulting remarks
to her in front of her male colleagues.10 As a result, Burlington
suspended the supervisor for ten days and ordered him to attend a sexualharassment training session.11 On September 26, Burlington’s
roadmaster, Marvin Brown, told White that he was reassigning her from
operating the forklift to performing only standard track laborer tasks.12
He explained that the reassignment was a reflection of co-workers’
complaints that, in fairness, a “more senior man” should have the
“cleaner” and “less arduous” job of operating the forklift.13
On October 10, White filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging that the reassignment
constituted unlawful gender-based discrimination and retaliation for her
initial complaint about her supervisor’s inappropriate remarks.14 In
December, White filed another retaliation complaint with the EEOC,
alleging that Brown had placed her under increased supervision and was
scrutinizing her activities from day to day.15
A few days after the second EEOC complaint was mailed to Brown,
White had a disagreement with her immediate supervisor.16 Her
immediate supervisor told Brown that White had been insubordinate.17
Consequently, Brown suspended White without pay. White appealed to

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
2004)).
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 2409.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 792 (6th Cir.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Burlington’s internal grievance procedures.18 This led Burlington to
decide that White had not been insubordinate.19 Accordingly, Burlington
reinstated White to her position and paid her for the thirty-seven days she
was suspended.20 White filed a third retaliation claim with the EEOC
based on the suspension.21
After filing the three EEOC claims, White filed a Title VII action
against Burlington in federal court.22 She claimed that Burlington
retaliated against her, in violation of Title VII, first when it reassigned
her, and again, when it suspended her.23 A jury found against Burlington
on both retaliation claims and awarded White $43,500 in compensatory
damages.24 After the trial, Burlington filed a motion for judgment as a
matter of law, which the district court denied.25 The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s judgment
in favor of White on both retaliation claims.26 Although all of the
members of the en banc court agreed to affirm the district court’s
judgment, they failed to agree on the retaliation standard to apply.27
Before Burlington, the circuits disagreed as to the standards
applicable in Title VII cases.28 The circuits answered two fundamental
questions in different ways: (1) whether the challenged employer action
had to be employment or workplace related, and (2) how harmful the
retaliatory action had to be to amount to actionable retaliation.29 The
disagreement ended in Burlington.
On the question of whether the challenged employer action had to be
employment or workplace related, the Supreme Court answered that Title
VII’s antiretaliation provision extends beyond retaliatory acts and harms
that are related to the workplace or employment.30 And on the question
of how harmful the retaliatory action had to be to amount to actionable
retaliation, the Court answered that a plaintiff must show that a
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially
adverse.31 The Court explained that this means the action “well might
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2410.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2414.
Id. at 2415.
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have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination.”32 This paper asserts that although Burlington’s
helpfulness is somewhat undermined by the questions it left unanswered
and the potential problems that may follow, the answers it did provide
are significant. They offer desperately needed relief to retaliation law,
improving it in a manner consistent with the purpose and design of Title
VII. Section II will give a detailed overview of the circuit split prior to
Burlington. Section III will discuss Burlington’s resolution to that split.
Section IV will discuss the importance of Burlington’s answers and
introduce the limits to their helpfulness. Finally, Section V will offer a
brief conclusion.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT PRIOR TO BURLINGTON
A. The “Adverse Employment Action” Standard
Prior to Burlington, some circuits required that the retaliatory action
be somehow related to employment or the workplace.33 These circuits
followed the “adverse employment action” standard. For example, the
Sixth Circuit majority in White v. Burlington Northern & Railway Co.
stated that a plaintiff must prove the existence of an “adverse
employment action” to support a Title VII claim.34 The Sixth Circuit
defined “adverse employment action” as a “materially adverse change in
the terms and conditions” of employment.35 In addition, the Second
Circuit in Torres v. Pisano stated that the existence of an “adverse
employment action” is essential to a plaintiff’s Title VII claim.36 Then
the court explained that to show that the plaintiff “suffered an adverse
employment action,” she had to show that she “suffered ‘a materially
adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.’”37
Similarly, in Von Gunten v. Maryland, the Fourth Circuit held that the
challenged retaliatory action had to result in an adverse effect on the
“terms, conditions, or benefits” of employment.38 Taking the same
approach, in Robinson v. Pittsburgh, the Third Circuit held that the

32. Id.
33. Id. at 2410.
34. 364 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2004).
35. Id. (citing Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999)).
36. 116 F.3d 625, 639 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Tomka v. Seiler Co., 66 F.3d 1295, 1308 (2d
Cir. 1995)).
37. Id. at 640 (quoting McKenney v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 903 F.Supp.
619, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
38. 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126
F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997)).
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challenged retaliatory conduct violates Title VII only if it alters the
employee’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment,” deprives the employee of “employment opportunities,” or
adversely affects the employee’s status as an employee.39 Thus, these
circuits required that the challenged retaliatory action be somehow
related to employment or the workplace.
B. The “Ultimate Employment Decision” Standard
Other circuits took an even more restrictive approach. The Fifth and
Eighth Circuits, for example, used the “ultimate employment decision”
standard. In Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., the Fifth Circuit stated that
“Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions.”40 It
defined “ultimate employment decisions” as acts “such as hiring,
granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating.”41 The Eighth
Circuit took the same approach in Manning v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co.42 In rejecting a retaliation claim brought by several
Metropolitan Life employees against the company, the court explained
that the employees “did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate
any adverse employment action that would amount to the type of
ultimate employment decision intended to be actionable under Title
VII.”43 The court suggested that evidence of a “tangible change in duties
or working conditions that constituted a material employment
disadvantage” may have satisfied the standard.44 Thus, as compared to
the “adverse employment action” standard, the “ultimate employment
decision” standard represented a more restrictive approach, prohibiting
retaliation only if it resulted in an ultimate employment decision.45

39. 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997).
40. 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir.
1995)).
41. Id. (quoting Dollis, 77 F.3d at 782).
42. 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir 1997).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. The Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ ultimate employment
decision standard: “‘ultimate employment decision’ is not the standard in this circuit. . . . [W]e have
expressly rejected distinctions, like those drawn by the Mattern court, between § 2000e-2 and §
2000e-3, reasoning that ‘conformity between the provisions of Title VII is to be preferred.’
Moreover, in Ross, we also implicitly rejected the Mattern court view that nothing less than an
‘ultimate employment decision’ can constitute adverse employment action under § 2000e-3.” Von
Gunten v. Maryland., 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Ross v. Commc’ns Satellite Corp.,
759 F.2d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 1985)).
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C. The “Threshold Level of Substantiality” Standard46
The Eleventh Circuit implicitly rejected the “ultimate employment
decision” standard. In Bass v. Board of Commissioners, the court first
stated that a plaintiff must show an “adverse employment action” as part
of their prima facie case of retaliation.47 The court then explained that
“[a]n adverse employment action is an ultimate employment decision,
such as discharge or failure to hire, or other conduct that alters the
employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, deprives him or her of employment opportunities, or
adversely affects his or her status as an employee.”48 However, the court
went on to say that conduct that did not amount to an ultimate
employment decision had to meet a “threshold level of substantiality” to
fall within the purview of the antiretaliation provision of Title VII.49
Since the court explicitly recognized the possibility that an actionable
retaliation claim might fall short of alleging an ultimate employment
decision, it implicitly rejected the ultimate employment decision
standard. The court further explained that although “‘not everything that
makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action,’ conduct
that alters an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment does constitute an adverse action under Title VII.”50
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit applied a standard more akin to the “adverse
employment action” standard than the “ultimate employment decision”
standard.

46. The Eleventh Circuit never labeled its retaliation standard as the “threshold level of
substantiality” standard. Nor has the phrase been used in other circuits to refer to the Eleventh
Circuit’s standard of retaliation. The phrase is used here simply to draw a line between the Eleventh
Circuit’s standard and the more general “adverse employment action” standard.
47. 256 F.3d 1095, 1117 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d
571, 587 (11th Cir. 2000)).
48. Id. at 1118 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gupta, 212 F.3d 571, 587).
49. Id. (quoting Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998)).
50. Bass, 256 F.3d at 1118 (quoting Smart v. Ball Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996)
and citing Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999) and Robinson
v. Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997)).
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D. Conformity Among the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eight, and
Eleventh Circuits
Although these circuits came to different conclusions on how
harmful the retaliatory action had to be to amount to actionable
retaliation all of them generally agreed that the action and any
consequent harms had to be related to the workplace or employment.51
Other circuits took a more expansive approach.
E. The “Material to a Reasonable Employee” Standard
The Seventh, Ninth, and the District of Columbia Circuits did not
insist upon a close relationship between the retaliatory action and the
workplace or employment.52 The Seventh Circuit and the District of
Columbia Circuit simply required that the plaintiff show that the
“employer’s challenged action would have been material to a reasonable
employee.”53 In Washington v. Illinois Department of Revenue, and in
Rochon v. Gonzales, the Seventh Circuit and the District of Columbia
Circuit explained that an employer’s action is material to a reasonable
employee if the challenged action would “have dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”54 In
Rochon v. Gonzales, the District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the
Seventh Circuit that “in order to support a claim of retaliation a plaintiff
must demonstrate the ‘employer’s challenged action would have been

51. This conclusion follows from the language used to articulate their respective retaliation
standards. Note that this language used to articulate their respective retaliation standards expressly
limited Title VII’s scope to employment-related or workplace-related actions and consequent harms.
For example, the Second and Sixth Circuits defined “adverse employment action” as action that
resulted in a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment. See White v.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2004). The Third and Fourth Circuits
defined “adverse employment action” as action that resulted in an adverse effect on the terms,
conditions, or benefits of employment. See Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir.
2001); Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300. And the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits defined “adverse
employment action” as action that resulted in an ultimate employment decision. See Bass, 256 F.3d
at 1118 (quoting Gupta, 212 F.3d at 587); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th
Cir. 1997) (quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781(5th Cir. 1995)); Manning v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997); see also discussion supra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C.
52. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that retaliation
includes “any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive.”) (quoting EEOC.E.O.C.
Compliance Manual § 8, “Retaliation,” ¶ 8008 (1998)); Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co., 183 F.3d 598,
606 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is broad enough to proscribe
retaliatory actions “that are not ostensibly employment related”).
53. Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Washington v. Ill.
Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005)); Washington, 420 F.3d at 662.
54. Washington, 420 F.3d at 662; Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219 (quoting Washington, 420 F.3d
at 662).
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material to a reasonable employee.’”55 Quoting the Seventh Circuit, the
District of Columbia Circuit defined “material to a reasonable employee”
as action that “well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”56
The Ninth Circuit also took a protective approach. Following EEOC
guidance, the Ninth Circuit simply required that the plaintiff establish
“adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably
likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected
activity.”57
F. Conformity Among the Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia
Circuits
These circuits generally agreed that the retaliatory action had to be
materially adverse to a reasonable employee and did not have to be
employment or workplace related in order to state a retaliation claim.
In sum, prior to Burlington the circuits disagreed on whether the
challenged employer action had to be employment or workplace related
and how harmful the action had to be to amount to retaliation. Some
required that the challenged employer action be employment or
workplace related (i.e., the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
and Eleventh). Some did not (i.e., the Seventh, Ninth, and District of
Columbia). Of those that required the challenged employer action to be
employment or workplace related, some required the action to result in
an “ultimate employment decision” (i.e., the Fifth and Eighth), and some
did not (i.e., the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh).
III. BURLINGTON’S RESOLUTION
In Burlington, the Supreme Court resolved the disagreement. On the
question of whether the challenged employer action had to be
employment or workplace related, the Court held that the “scope of the
antiretaliation provision extends beyond workplace-related or
employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.”58 In so holding, the Court
expressly rejected the “ultimate employment decision[]” standard and
“the standards applied in the Courts of Appeals that have treated [Title
VII’s] antiretaliation provision as forbidding the same conduct prohibited
55. 438 F.3d at 1219.
56. Id. (quoting Washington, 420 F.3d at 662).
57. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual § 8,
“Retaliation,” ¶ 8008 (1998)).
58. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414 (2006).
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by the antidiscrimination provision” (i.e., the standards that required a
relationship between the challenged act and the workplace or
employment, specifically the standards in the Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits).59 On the question of how
harmful the retaliatory action had to be to amount to actionable
retaliation, the Court held that “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable
employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse.”60
The Court explained that a plaintiff must show that the challenged action
“well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.’”61
A. The Scope of Title VII’s Antiretaliation Provision Extends Beyond
Workplace-Related or Employment-Related Retaliatory Acts and Harm
The Court relied on several bases to conclude that the scope of Title
VII’s antiretaliation provision can reach retaliatory acts that are not
related to employment or the workplace. First, the Court examined the
language of Title VII’s antidiscrimination and antiretaliation
provisions.62 The Court determined that the antidiscrimination provision
contains words limiting its scope to actions that affect employment or
change the conditions of the workplace.63 In contrast, the antiretaliation
provision contains no such limiting words.64 The Court concluded that
Congress likely “intended the different words to make a legal
difference.”65 The Court based its conclusion in part on the presumption
that where particular language is used in one section of a statute but
omitted in another section of the same Act, the disparate inclusion or
exclusion is intentional.66
Second, the Court compared the purpose of Title VII’s
antidiscrimination provision to the purpose of its antiretaliation provision
and determined that the two provisions have different purposes.67 The
Court explained that the purpose of the antidiscrimination provision is to
prevent harm to individuals based on their status, which Congress could
accomplish without prohibiting anything other than employment-related

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 2415.
Id. (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
Id. at 2411–12 (comparing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000) and § 2000e-2(a)(2)).
Id.
Id. at 2412.
Id.
Id. (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
Id. at 2412.
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discrimination.68 The purpose of the antiretaliation provision, on the
other hand, is to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do,
which Congress could not accomplish by prohibiting only employer
actions and harm that relate to employment or the workplace.69 If
Congress prohibited only employer actions and harm that are
employment related or workplace related, an employer could retaliate
against an employee by causing the employee harm outside the
workplace or taking acts not directly related to employment.70
Accordingly, if the antiretaliation provision were limited to employmentrelated actions, it would fail to deter the many forms that retaliation can
take.71 Thus, the Court determined that the antiretaliation provision is not
limited to employment-related or workplace-related discriminatory
actions.72
Third, the Court turned to precedent and determined that no prior
Supreme Court case required a contrary result.73 The Court conceded that
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth spoke of “a Title VII requirement
that violations involve . . . ‘hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits.’”74 However, the Court
explained that Ellerth spoke of the requirement only to “‘identify a class
of [hostile work environment] cases’ in which an employer should be
held vicariously liable (without an affirmative defense) for the acts of
supervisors.”75 The Court emphasized that Ellerth did not address the
scope of Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision and did not even bring
up Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.76 Thus, the Court maintained that
the decision in Ellerth did not compel a contrary result in Burlington.
Fourth, the Court examined the EEOC’s interpretations of the
antiretaliation provision.77 Although the Court admitted that the EEOC’s
1991 and 1988 Compliance Manuals expressly limited the antiretaliation
provision’s scope to adverse employment-related action, it emphasized
that in those same manuals the EEOC used language suggesting a

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2412–13.
73. Id. at 2413.
74. Id. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).
75. Id. (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2413–14 (finding no “significant support for [Ellerth’s] view in the EEOC’s
interpretations of the provision”).
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broader interpretation.78 The Court explained that “both before and after
publication of the 1991 and 1988 manuals, the EEOC similarly expressed
a broad interpretation of the antiretaliation provision.”79 It also noted that
in the 1998 Manual, the EEOC addressed the question of whether the
antiretaliation provision of Title VII is limited to employment-related
activity and concluded that it is not.80 Thus, the Court determined that the
EEOC’s interpretations of the antiretaliation provision did not support
the view that the challenged retaliatory act must be employment related
to support a Title VII retaliation claim.81
After finding support for its conclusion on those four bases, the
Court stated its defense to the argument that it would be “anomalous” to
interpret Title VII “to provide broader protection for victims of
retaliation than for those whom Title VII primarily seeks to protect,
namely, victims of . . . discrimination.”82 It noted that “Congress has
provided similar kinds of protection” in other statutes “without any
judicial suggestion that those provisions are limited to the conduct
prohibited by the primary substantive provisions.”83 The Court went on
to explain that “differences in the purpose of the antiretaliation and
antidiscrimination provisions remove any perceived ‘anomaly,’ for
they. . . [] justify [the] difference of interpretation.”84 It reemphasized
that “interpreting the antiretaliation
provision to provide broad
protection from retaliation” furthers the primary objective of the
statute—securing a workplace where individuals are not discriminated
against because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based status—
because it helps assure the “cooperation of employees [in] . . . fil[ing]
complaints and act[ing] as witnesses.”85
Given that defense, and support from the language, purpose,
precedent, and EEOC interpretations of Title VII, the Court concluded
that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is not limited to employmentrelated or workplace-related retaliatory acts and harms.86

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 2413.
Id.
Id. at 2413–14.
Id. at 2413.
Id. at 2414.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. To Violate Title VII’s Antiretaliation Provision, the Plaintiff Must
Show that a Reasonable Employee Would Have Found the Challenged
Action Materially Adverse
After deciding the first issue, whether the challenged retaliatory
action had to be employment related, the Court turned to the issue of how
harmful the action had to be to constitute retaliation. The Court
concluded that “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would
have found the challenged retaliatory action materially adverse,” which
means that “it well might have dissuaded a reasonable employee from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”87 In speaking of
“material” adverseness, the Court explained that it is meant to distinguish
“significant from trivial harms.”88 In speaking of reactions of a
“reasonable” employee, the Court noted, it intended to set forth an
“objective standard.”89 The Court phrased the standard in broad terms, it
explained, “because the significance of any given act of retaliation will
often depend on the particular circumstances.”90 By way of example, the
Court noted that “a schedule change in an employee’s work schedule
may make little difference to many workers, but may matter enormously
to a young mother with small children.”91 Thus, the Court concluded, “a
legal standard that speaks in general terms rather than specific prohibited
acts is preferable . . . .”92
C. Application of the New Standard
In applying the new standard to the facts of the case at bar, the Court
concluded that based on the record, a jury could reasonably conclude that
both challenged acts of retaliation—the reassignment of responsibilities
and the thirty-seven day suspension without pay—would have been
materially adverse to a reasonable employee.93 Accordingly, the Court
affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.94

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 2415 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2416.
Id. at 2417.
Id.
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IV. LIMITS TO BURLINGTON’S HELPFULNESS
Burlington provided answers to the two fundamental questions that
split the circuits—(1) whether the challenged employer action had to be
employment or workplace related, and (2) how harmful the retaliatory
action had to be to amount to actionable retaliation. However, Burlington
left some questions unanswered. For example, it did not explicitly state a
legal basis for the retaliation standard it adopted. Nor did it explain why
the standard only proscribes those employer actions that well might have
dissuaded a reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination. It did not explain what subjective factors are appropriate
for consideration under the standard. Nor did it explain how the
standard’s causation element can be satisfied.
Although Burlington’s helpfulness is somewhat undermined by the
questions it left unanswered and the potential problems that may follow,
the answers it did provide are significant. To illustrate the point,
Subsection A will discuss a case decided by the Fifth Circuit prior to
Burlington, using the ultimate employment decision standard. It will
assert that the ultimate employment decision standard was flawed by
positing the likely result of the case if it had been before any other circuit
and noting the disparity between the likely results in those circuits and
the actual result in the Fifth. Finally, it will show how Burlington
addressed the flaws in the Fifth Circuit’s ultimate employment decision
standard. Subsection B will offer a brief overview of some of the
questions Burlington left unanswered and explain why they may not be
as problematic as they seem.
A. Answers
Burlington is helpful in the sense that it resolved the disagreement
among the circuits about whether a challenged retaliatory action had to
be employment or workplace related and about how harmful that action
had to be to amount to retaliation. Prior to Burlington, retaliation was a
very confused area of law. Different circuits applied different standards.
Some insisted that the challenged employer action result in an ultimate
employment decision and others recognized less extreme employer
actions. By holding that the challenged employer action does not have to
be related to the workplace or employment and by setting forth a test for
determining if the action is harmful enough to amount to retaliation,
Burlington created uniformity and provided at least some clarity to
retaliation law. Theoretically, then, cases with similar facts will now
have similar results, no matter the circuit. Prior to Burlington, cases with
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similar facts could easily have different results, depending entirely on the
circuit. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co. is a perfect case in point.
1. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co.
The Fifth Circuit decided Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co. nine years
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington.95 Applying the
ultimate decision standard, the Fifth Circuit rejected a retaliation claim
based on the type of discriminatory changes in the plaintiff’s terms,
conditions, and benefits of employment that most other courts would
have easily recognized as sufficient to amount to retaliation under Title
VII.96 Jean Mattern was registered in Eastman’s mechanic’s
apprenticeship program, which consisted of hands-on training and
classroom instruction.97 The program incorporated “Major Skills Tests”
as well as fourteen “review cycles.”98 Successful completion of the
review cycles led to regular salary increases.99 On the other hand,
apprentices who performed poorly on three review cycles or failed three
skills tests could be dismissed from the program.100
In March, 1993, Mattern filed a Title VII charge with the EEOC,
claiming that two senior mechanics had sexually harassed her and that
her supervisors were aware of it.101 After learning of the charge, Eastman
transferred Mattern to another crew where she worked under a different
immediate supervisor but the same departmental supervisors.102 She
continued to experience “difficulties.”103 She eventually resigned and
filed an action against Eastman, alleging, among other things, that it “had
a policy and practice of approving and condoning a hostile work
environment,” and that it “had retaliated, and allowed its employees to
retaliate, against her for reporting the harassment to the EEOC and for
filing [the] action.”104 A jury found that, although Eastman employees
had harassed Mattern, Eastman had taken timely corrective action in
response.105 Consequently, Mattern lost her hostile work environment

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 710; see Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 864 (4th Cir. 2001).
Mattern, 104 F.3d at 703.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 704.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sexual harassment claim.106 However, the jury found in Mattern’s favor
with respect to her retaliation claim and awarded damages.107
Eastman appealed the jury’s decision to the Fifth Circuit.108 The Fifth
Circuit majority held that the retaliation evidence was insufficient and
reversed the jury’s verdict.109 The court divided Mattern’s retaliation
evidence into five parts. First, on a day Mattern had taken vacation leave
after complaining of a work-related illness, Eastman sent two
supervisors, one of whom was named in the EEOC charge, to her home
to tell her to return to Eastman Medical if her illness was work-related.110
In similar situations, supervisors were rarely, if ever, sent to an
employee’s home.111 Second, Mattern was disciplined for leaving her
work station to report the harassment to Eastman’s Human Resources
Department.112 Third, in the aftermath of Mattern’s EEOC charge, her
coworkers repeatedly harassed her.113 Mattern testified that one of her
supervisors threatened to fire her.114 She also testified that her coworkers
broke into her locker, stole some of her tools, and told her “accidents
happen.”115 Fourth, the harassment made Mattern physically sick.116
Fifth, after Mattern’s EEOC charge, Mattern’s work received poor
reviews, resulting in a missed pay increase and a “final warning” of
dismissal from the apprenticeship program.117 Many of the negative
reviews, which were coming from supervisors who had praised Mattern’s
work in the past, resulted from her “apparent” inability to rebuild and
realign pumps.118 For instance, prior to her resignation, Mattern was
assigned to rebuild a pump.119 Although the mechanic who worked on
the pump with her testified that Mattern rebuilt it correctly, another
coworker, whom Mattern had named in her EEOC charge, told Mattern’s
supervisor that the pump was not rebuilt correctly.120 As a result, Mattern

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 709–10.
110. Id. at 705.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 706 (explaining that Mattern’s doctor thought her illness was a result of the
hostility at Eastman).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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failed the assignment.121 In another instance, Mattern’s supervisor told
her to realign a pump while he watched.122 The pump was resting on a
wooden pallet, which made it more difficult to realign.123 Mattern was
unable to complete the assignment.124 She testified that the pump was
purposefully placed on the wooden pallet, as opposed to a more solid
base, to derail her.125
Despite all of this evidence offered in support of Mattern’s
retaliation claim, the Fifth Circuit majority held it insufficient. The court
emphasized that “Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment
decisions, not to address every decision made by employers that arguably
might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions.”126 The
court explained that none of the events Mattern complained of amounted
to an ultimate employment decision, “such as hiring, granting leave,
discharging, promoting, and compensating.”127 The visit to her home, the
reprimand for being away from her work station, the missed pay
increase, and the placement on “final warning” all lacked
consequence.128 The same analysis applied to Mattern’s other problems.
Failing two Major Skills Tests and having reprimands documented in her
file may have increased her chances of being discharged, but they did not
result in her being discharged or in any other ultimate employment
decision.129 Therefore, all of Mattern’s retaliation evidence was deemed
insufficient to amount to retaliation.130
2. The Fifth Circuit standard’s flaws
The Fifth Circuit’s ultimate employment decision standard was
flawed in at least two respects. First, it interpreted Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision to proscribe only ultimate employment decisions
and not the “vague” harms contemplated by its antidiscrimination
provision.131 Accordingly, under the Fifth Circuit’s standard, an
121. See id. (explaining that Mattern’s supervisor documented the pump failure).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 707 (quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781–82 (5th Cir. 1995)).
127. Id. (quoting Dollis, 77 F.3d at 782).
128. Id. at 708.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 709–10 (explaining that the antiretaliation provision speaks only of
“discrimination,” and therefore does not contemplate the vague harms—such as the deprivation of
employment opportunities or an adverse affect on an employee’s status—that Title VII’s
antidiscrimination provision does).

399]

RETALIATION CLARIFIED IN BURLINGTON

415

employer could effectively retaliate against an employee, even if the
retaliatory actions deprived the employee of opportunities or adversely
affected their status, so long as the actions did not result in an ultimate
employment decision.132 Second, the Fifth Circuit’s ultimate employment
decision standard effectively eliminated consideration of hostile work
environment harassment as a separate basis for retaliation. Thus, under
the Fifth Circuit’s standard, an employer could successfully retaliate
against an employee for filing a hostile work environment harassment
claim (or any other discrimination claim) by creating a hostile work
environment.133 Although it is unclear whether the Fifth Circuit intended
these results, it is clear that those results were inconsistent with the
purpose and design of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.
The Fifth Circuit standard’s flaws can be illustrated by positing how
the Mattern decision might have had a different result if it had been
decided by another circuit. Arguably, had the same retaliation evidence
been presented to any other circuit, Mattern’s favorable jury verdict
would have been upheld. In Ross, decided by the Fourth Circuit, a
Communications Satellite Corporation (“COMSAT”) employee brought
action against the company, alleging that it retaliated against him for
filing a sex discrimination claim with the EEOC.134 The employee
contended that, after he filed the EEOC claim, he experienced
harassment by COMSAT superiors.135 He also alleged that COMSAT
essentially demoted him, “denied [him] a performance review and annual
pay and benefit increases,” and misrepresented his employment record to
other employers.136 In addition, the employee alleged that his
performance evaluations fell after the filing of the EEOC claim, even
though he had received generally positive evaluations before it.137
Because the Fourth Circuit determined that the district court had
improperly relied on the preclusive effect of a state administrative
decision in granting summary judgment to the employer, it reversed and
remanded the employee’s retaliation claim “for reconsideration of the
propriety of summary judgment” and “for trial,” if necessary.138 In doing

132. See id.
133. Note that although, under the Fifth Circuit’s standard, an employer could theoretically
retaliate against an employee by creating a hostile work environment, the creation of a hostile work
environment could subject the employer to liability for discrimination. Of course, the employer
could avoid an adverse finding on a subsequent hostile work environment discrimination claim by
taking remedial action after retaliating.
134. Ross v. Commc’ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 356–57 (4th Cir. 1985).
135. Id. at 357.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 363.
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so, the court recognized that the alleged acts, if proved, could constitute
unlawful retaliation under Title VII.139
The retaliatory acts alleged in Ross were similar to those alleged in
Mattern. Both employees alleged that following their respective EEOC
charges, their work was evaluated more negatively, their coworkers
harassed them, and they were denied a pay increase. Given that the
Fourth Circuit in Ross recognized that the alleged retaliatory acts, if
proved, could constitute retaliation, and that the alleged acts were similar
to those complained of in Mattern, if the Fourth Circuit had decided
Mattern, it likely would have found retaliation. This follows not only
from a comparison between the retaliatory acts in the two cases, but also
from the Fourth Circuit’s criticism of the Fifth Circuit’s retaliation
standard.
In Von Gunten, the Fourth Circuit noted that Ross implicitly rejected
the Mattern court’s view that only an ultimate employment decision can
amount to retaliation under Title VII.140 The court rejected the Mattern
court’s interpretation of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision (proscribing
only ultimate employment decisions and excluding the vague harms
contemplated by the antidiscrimination provision), stating that
conformity between the two provisions was to be preferred.141 In other
words, the Fourth Circuit suggested that Title VII’s antiretaliation
provision proscribes the same conduct proscribed by its
antidiscrimination provision, not just conduct that results in an ultimate
employment decision. Considering this criticism, the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in Ross, and the retaliatory acts in Ross compared to those in
Mattern, the Mattern decision probably would have been different if the
case had been before the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit recognized
that the alleged acts in Ross, if proved, could constitute retaliation. The
alleged acts in Ross were similar to those in Mattern. In addition, the
Fourth Circuit implicitly rejected the ultimate employment decision
standard applied by the Fifth Circuit in Mattern, suggesting that
retaliatory acts do not have to result in an ultimate employment decision
to constitute retaliation. Arguably, then, if the Fourth Circuit had decided
Mattern, it would have found retaliation.
Had Mattern been decided by other circuits, again, the result
probably would have been different. This follows not only from the fact
139. Id.; see Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001). Note that if the
Fourth Circuit had determined that the alleged acts, if proved, could not constitute retaliation,
remand would have been unnecessary.
140. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865 (citing Ross v. Commc’ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355,
366 (4th Cir. 1985)).
141. Id. (quoting Ross, 759 F.2d at 363 (stating that conformity between the antidiscrimination
and antiretaliation provisions of Title VII is to be preferred)).
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that other circuits’ standards would not have required Mattern to show
that she suffered an ultimate employment decision, but also from their
recognition of hostile work environment as a separate type of retaliation.
In finding against Mattern on her retaliation claim, the Fifth Circuit noted
that the jury found against her on her sexual harassment and constructive
discharge claims.142 The court then explained that those two adverse
findings limited the possibility of finding retaliation.143 Although the
court did not explicitly dismiss consideration of Mattern’s hostile work
environment claim as not qualifying as retaliation, it implicitly did so by
limiting the bases for finding retaliation to the jury’s findings in her
favor. In other words, by reviewing Mattern’s retaliation claim in the
context of the jury’s adverse findings on her sexual harassment claim,144
which was based on the creation of a hostile work environment, the Fifth
Circuit effectively precluded consideration of the alleged creation of a
hostile work environment as a separate type of retaliation. Essentially,
the Fifth Circuit majority relied on the outcome of the substantive
discrimination claim to decide the retaliation issue, considering the two
claims (discrimination and retaliation) as not only related, but
inextricably tied.
The dissent criticized this approach, arguing that, contrary to the
majority’s interpretation, “§ 704(a) affords an employee an independent
hostile work environment retaliatory discrimination cause of action upon
which she may recover in a proper case regardless of the outcome of her
§ 703 sex discrimination and constructive discharge claims.”145 In other
words, the dissent viewed Mattern’s discrimination and retaliation claims
as separate and distinct. From that perspective, the dissent determined
that the jury’s verdict in favor of Mattern on her retaliation claim was not
clearly erroneous and should have been affirmed.146
Concerning Mattern’s sexual harassment claim, the jury had been
instructed that Title VII proscribes “unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, [and] other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature where the conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with the individual’s work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.”147 The
jury was further instructed that for Eastman to be liable to Mattern for
142. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 704 (5th Cir. 1997).
143. Id.
144. See id. (stating that Mattern’s retaliation claim must be viewed in the context of the jury’s
adverse findings on her sexual harassment and constructive discharge claims).
145. Id. at 710 (Dennis, J., dissenting). Note that section 704 is Title VII’s antiretaliation
provision and section 703 is its antidiscrimination provision.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 706.
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the actions of its employees, Mattern had to prove: “that she was
subjected to unwelcome harassment in the form of sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature; . . . that the harassment was based on her sex; . . . that the
harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of her employment;
and . . . [that] Eastman either knew or should have known that [Mattern]
was being sexually harassed and failed to take prompt reasonable
measures to stop the harassment.”148
Because the jury found that Eastman had acted promptly in taking
remedial action, and therefore Mattern failed to make one of the
necessary findings required for Eastman to be held liable for sexual
harassment for the acts of its employees against her, the jury found
against Mattern on her hostile work environment sexual harassment
claim. The majority assumed, without discussion, that the jury’s adverse
decision on the hostile work environment sexual harassment claim was
simultaneously an adverse decision on whether Eastman created a hostile
work environment.149 In other words, the majority assumed that because
the jury found against Mattern on her hostile work environment sexual
harassment claim, Eastman did not create an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.
Given that Title VII proscribes sexual harassment, that the creation
of a hostile work environment is a type of sexual harassment, and that the
jury found against Mattern on her sexual harassment claim, the
majority’s assumption makes sense. The premise was that if the jury had
found the creation of a hostile working environment it would have had to
find unlawful sexual harassment. If the premise were sound, it would
follow that if the jury had found any other type of sexual harassment, for
instance, unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors, it
also would have had to find sexual harassment. However, that is not
necessarily true. A finding of unwelcome sexual advances or requests for
sexual favors, or other sexual conduct having the purpose or effect of
creating a hostile work environment was only the first step in the
analysis. Before the jury could find that any of those types of sexual
harassment amounted to unlawful sexual harassment, it had to find, in
addition, that the harassment was based on sex, that it affected a term,
condition, or privilege of employment, and that Eastman knew, or had
reason to know, about it and failed to take prompt action to stop it. Thus,
the majority’s premise was flawed. The jury could have found that
Mattern suffered unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,

148. Id.
149. Id. at 704.

399]

RETALIATION CLARIFIED IN BURLINGTON

419

or other sexual conduct that had the purpose or effect of creating a
hostile work environment and simultaneously found no sexual
harassment.
In sum, an adverse finding on a hostile work environment sexual
harassment claim does not necessarily preclude a favorable finding on
the underlying question of whether there was a hostile work
environment. In Mattern, the jury found against Mattern on her sexual
harassment claim based on its finding that Eastman took prompt action to
stop the harassment, not based on a finding that there was no harassment,
which may have created a hostile work environment. To the contrary, the
jury found that there was harassment.150 However, based on the
instructions, the jury could not find Eastman liable for sexual harassment
for the acts of its employees if it found that Eastman took prompt action
to stop the harassment. Because the jury found that Eastman did take
prompt action to stop the harassment, it had to find against Mattern on
her hostile work environment sexual harassment claim.151 In other words,
Mattern’s hostile work environment sexual harassment claim could not
provide a basis for unlawful discrimination. The majority assumed,
without articulating any basis for the assumption, that Mattern’s hostile
work environment sexual harassment claim could not provide a basis for
unlawful retaliation either. However, its assumption was inconsistent
with its interpretation of Title VII’s antiretaliation and antidiscrimination
provisions.
The Mattern majority relied on the language of Title VII’s
antidiscrimination provision compared to the antiretaliation provision to
support its ultimate employment decision standard.152 The majority
specifically noted that the first subpart of Title VII’s antidiscrimination
provision states that it is unlawful to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual . . . with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment.”153 The majority explained that “[t]his type of
employer action contrasts sharply with the . . . vague proscription, found
in the next subpart.”154 The next subpart states that it is unlawful for an
employer to limit, segregate, or classify their employees or applicants for
employment in any way that would deprive or tend to deprive them of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect their status as an
employee.155 The majority noted that the second subpart reaches much

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text.
104 F.3d at 708–709.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000)).
Id. at 709.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000).

420

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 21

farther than the first, extending to employer acts that simply “tend” to
affect employees.156 The majority then turned to the antiretaliation
provision and noted that it “speaks only of discrimination” and does not
mention the vague harms contemplated by the second subsection of the
antidiscrimination provision.157 Accordingly the majority held that the
antiretaliation “provision can only be read to exclude such vague harms,
and to include only ultimate employment decisions.”158
By describing as vague only those harms listed in the
antidiscrimination provision’s second-subpart, and holding that the
antiretaliation provision does not extend to such vague harms, the
majority implicitly recognized that the antiretaliation provision does
extend to non-vague harms, like those described in the antidiscrimination
provision’s first subpart. Arguably, the creation of a hostile work
environment is the type of harm more akin to that described by the
antidiscrimination provision’s first subpart—discrimination with respect
to an employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment—than
to the type of vague harm contemplated by the provision’s second
subpart. Indeed, the creation of a hostile work environment does more
than merely “tend” to affect an employee. Therefore, it follows that
discrimination in the form of the creation of a hostile work environment
is a “non-vague” harm that is covered by Title VII’s antiretaliation
provision, and the Mattern majority’s refusal to consider Mattern’s
hostile work environment sexual harassment claim as a separate basis for
retaliation was inappropriate even by its own standards. To be sure, the
Mattern dissent spoke of the majority’s misinterpretation of Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision and determined that Mattern’s hostile work
environment sexual harassment claim should have been considered as an
independent cause of action for retaliation and, furthermore, could have
provided a basis for finding in Mattern’s favor on her retaliation claim.159
The majority of other circuits probably would have agreed. Prior to
Burlington, what separated the majority of other circuits from the Fifth
Circuit (and the Eighth, for that matter) was the Fifth Circuit’s insistence
that the challenged retaliatory action result in an ultimate employment
decision. Thus, in Mattern, the Fifth Circuit would not recognize
Mattern’s hostile work environment claim as an appropriate basis for
asserting unlawful retaliation, in part, because it simply did not recognize
harassment as constituting an ultimate employment decision. Therefore,
a retaliation claim could never be predicated on a harassment claim,
156.
157.
158.
159.

Mattern, 104 F.3d at 709 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (2000)).
Id. (comparing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000)).
Id.
Id. at 710 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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regardless of the type of harassment (unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, creation of a hostile work environment, etc.)
because such a claim, without more, would always fall short of the
ultimate employment decision standard.
The majority’s logic led to perverse results. Under the Fifth Circuit’s
standard, an employer could effectively retaliate against an employee
who filed a hostile work environment harassment claim (or any other
discrimination claim) by creating a hostile work environment. This was
clearly inconsistent with Title VII’s design to encourage the creation of
antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms.160
Furthermore, it was inconsistent with Title VII’s purpose to prevent
employers from engaging in retaliatory measures that dissuade
employees from engaging in protected conduct.161
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit, other circuits—those that applied less
restrictive standards of retaliation—certainly would have recognized
Mattern’s hostile work environment claim as an independent cause of
action for retaliation, and possibly would have found retaliation on that
basis, if not on another. In Jensen v. Potter, for example, the Third
Circuit cited to its decision in Robinson to hold that a retaliation claim
predicated upon a hostile work environment claim is actionable under
Title VII.162 The court explained that Title VII’s antidiscrimination
provision proscribes “a quantum of discrimination coterminous with that
prohibited by [its antiretaliation provision].”163 Accordingly, the court
concluded that since Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision applied to
hostile work environment claims, so did its antiretaliation provision.164
Other circuits, specifically the First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, have also
recognized retaliation claims, predicated on hostile work environment
claims, as cognizable under Title VII.165 Arguably, then, these circuits
(the First, Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits) would have considered
Mattern’s hostile work environment claim in evaluating her retaliation
claim, and may have used it as a separate basis for affirming the jury’s
verdict. Of course, these circuits may have affirmed the jury’s verdict
simply by finding that the challenged retaliatory acts met their respective
standards of retaliation on a basis apart from hostile work environment
sexual harassment.166
160. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
162. 435 F.3d 444, 448–49 (3d Cir. 2006).
163. Id. at 448 (citing Robinson v. Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300–01 (3d Cir. 1997).
164. Id. at 449.
165. See, e.g., Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 95 (1st Cir. 2005); Ray v. Henderson,
217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998).
166. This is especially true for the Ninth Circuit, whose standard is especially broad, requiring
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Even the Eighth Circuit, notwithstanding its restrictive position prior
to Burlington, would probably have reached a different conclusion than
the Fifth Circuit if it had decided Mattern. Although the Eighth Circuit
expressly adopted the ultimate employment decision standard, it often
applied a broader standard. For example, in Manning v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co., the court recognized that evidence of a “tangible
change in duties or working conditions that constituted a material
employment disadvantage” could amount to the sort of ultimate
employment decision proscribed by Title VII.167
As previously noted, in Mattern, part of Mattern’s retaliation
evidence consisted of her testimony regarding Eastman’s, and its
employees’, harassment toward her. In one instance, Mattern was
assigned to rebuild a pump, and although the mechanic who worked on
the pump with her testified that Mattern rebuilt it correctly, another
coworker, whom Mattern had named in her EEOC charge, told Mattern’s
supervisor that the pump was not rebuilt correctly.168 As a result, Mattern
failed the reassembly assignment.169 In sustaining the jury’s verdict on
Mattern’s retaliation claim, and commenting on that particular incident,
the district court noted that “[t]ampering with another employee’s work
by another employee could reasonably be construed as sabotage
condoned or directed by an employer for the purpose of establishing
cause for discharge, demotion, reprimand or refusal to promote. This
sabotage could have reasonably taken place in response to . . . Mattern’s
actions regarding her complaints of sexual harassment.”170
In addition, Mattern testified that on another occasion her supervisor
asked her to realign a pump while he watched.171 The pump was resting
on a wooden pallet, which made it more difficult to realign.172
only that the plaintiff establish “adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is
reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity.” Ray, 217
F.3d at 1242–43 (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual § 8, “Retaliation,” ¶ 8008 (1998)). The Ninth
Circuit could easily interpret Mattern’s experiences following her EEOC charge—the visit from her
supervisors, the reprimand for being away from her work station to report the harassment she was
experiencing, being placed on final warning, missing a pay increase, etc.—as adverse treatment that
stemmed from a retaliatory motive and was reasonably likely to derail her or others from engaging in
protected activity.
167. 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997). See also Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1060
(8th Cir. 1997) (recognizing employment consequences including the reduction of duties, lower
performance evaluations, required special remedial training, and papering of the employee’s file
with negative reports as serious enough to satisfy the ultimate employment decision standard, even
though the employee was not discharged, demoted, or suspended).
168. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 706 (5th Cir. 1997).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 713–14 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (quoting District Court’s September 12, 1995, Order
at 2–3).
171. Id. at 706.
172. Id.
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Consequently, Mattern failed the assignment.173 She testified that she felt
the pump had been deliberately placed on the wooden pallet to derail
her.174 If heard by the Eighth Circuit, this testimony could have presented
evidence of the type of tangible change in working conditions that
constitutes a material employment disadvantage and is therefore intended
to be actionable under Title VII. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit recognized that
Mattern’s negative reports, including her missed pay increase, resulted
directly from her “apparent inability” to rebuild and realign pumps.”175
Given that the negative reports jeopardized Mattern’s placement in
Eastman’s apprenticeship program,176 they certainly disadvantaged her.
The missed pay increase alone likely constituted the type of material
employment disadvantage that, according to the Eighth Circuit, Title VII
was intended to proscribe. Therefore, had the Eighth Circuit decided
Mattern, the case likely would have had a different result.
3. Burlington’s response
In sum, prior to Burlington, a case brought in one circuit could easily
have a different result in another. Mattern is simply one example. This
was the inevitable consequence of the absence of a uniform standard of
retaliation. By creating a uniform standard, Burlington largely eliminated
the potential for disparity between the results in one circuit compared to
the results in another. It is therefore helpful in that sense. Since
Burlington, retaliation plaintiffs no longer have to demonstrate that a
challenged retaliatory action constituted an ultimate employment
decision. They do not even have to show that the action was in any way
connected to their employment. Burlington made that crystal clear: “[t]he
scope of the antiretaliation provision extends beyond workplace-related
or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.”177 Thus, Burlington
fixed the first flaw in the Fifth Circuit’s standard. An employer can no
longer effectively retaliate against an employee by taking retaliatory
actions that deprive the employee of opportunities or adversely affect
their status, just because those actions do not result in an ultimate
employment decision. Burlington fixed the Fifth Circuit standard’s
second flaw in the same breath. Neither the Fifth Circuit, nor any other
court, can refuse to recognize a hostile work environment harassment
claim as a separate basis for retaliation based on the fact that hostile
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 708.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414 (2006).
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work environment harassment is not an ultimate employment decision.
These results are consistent with Title VII’s design—to encourage the
creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance measures, and
with Title VII’s purpose—to prevent employers from engaging in
retaliatory measures that dissuade employees from engaging in protected
conduct.178
In addition, Burlington specified the type of employer actions that
are covered by Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. Now, plaintiffs have
an identified threshold level of substantiality that they must meet: they
“must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged
action materially adverse,” which means that the challenged action “well
might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination.’”179 This point also fixed the Fifth Circuit
standard’s second flaw. Hostile work environment harassment is likely
action that well might dissuade a reasonable employee from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination. Thus, the Fifth Circuit, and every
other court, will probably have to recognize hostile work environment
harassment as a separate basis for retaliation. Accordingly, an employer
will no longer be able, theoretically, to retaliate against an employee who
files a hostile work environment harassment claim (or any other
discrimination claim) by creating a hostile work environment. Again,
these results are consistent with the design and purpose of Title VII.
In sum, Burlington is helpful because it created a uniform standard
of retaliation that specifically addressed the flaws in the ultimate
employment decision standard, applied by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits,
in a manner consistent with the design and purpose of Title VII.
However, Burlington’s helpfulness has limits. Even though the answers
it provided are significant, they are somewhat undermined by the
questions it left unanswered and by the potential problems that may
follow.

178. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
179. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C.
Cir. 2006)).
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B. Questions
Unfortunately, the answers Burlington provided compel various
questions. But since Burlington implied answers to some of the more
troubling questions, they may not be as problematic as they seem.
1. What is the legal basis for the “well might have dissuaded a
reasonable worker” standard?
First, the majority did not explain how its interpretation of Title
VII’s antidiscrimination and antiretaliation provisions compelled the
standard it adopted. The majority examined the language of the
antiretaliation provision and the language of the antidiscrimination
provision and found that, as opposed to the antidiscrimination provision,
the antiretaliation provision contains no words limiting its scope to
workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory actions.180 Based on
the language itself and on the different purposes behind the two
provisions, the majority concluded that Congress intended the
difference.181 Therefore, it held that the antiretaliation provision is not
limited to employment-related or workplace-related retaliatory acts and
harm.182
The majority also held, however, that the antiretaliation provision
proscribes those retaliatory actions that “well might have dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.”183 The majority did not state that the antiretaliation
provision proscribes only those retaliatory actions that well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination, but the conclusion follows from the fact that “a plaintiff
must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged
action materially adverse,” which means that the challenged action “well
might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination.’”184 Thus, a plaintiff cannot succeed on a
retaliation claim unless they can demonstrate that the retaliatory action
would have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination. Accordingly, under the majority’s standard,
Title VII proscribes “only those retaliatory acts that ‘well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 2411–12; see also supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2411-12; see also supra notes 62–72 and accompanying text.
Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2414.
Id.
Id. (quoting Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219) (emphasis added).
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discrimination.’”185 In contrast to its conclusion that the retaliatory action
does not have to be employment related, the majority reached this
conclusion without explicitly providing a basis for it.
As Justice Alito suggested in his concurrence, “[t]he language of [the
antiretaliation provision], which employs the unadorned term
‘discriminate,’ does not support [the majority’s] test. The unstated
premise of the majority’s reasoning seems to [have] be[en] that [the
antiretaliation provision’s] only purpose is to prevent employers from
taking those actions that are likely to stop employees from complaining
about discrimination, but this unstated premise is unfounded.”186 Alito
continued:
While surely one of the purposes of [the antiretaliation provision] is to
prevent employers from engaging in retaliatory measures that dissuade
employees from engaging in protected conduct, there is no reason to
suppose that this is [the antiretaliation provision’s] only purpose.
Indeed, the majority itself identifies another purpose of the
antiretaliation provision: ‘to prevent harm to individuals’ who assert
their rights.187

2. Why is the “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker”
standard so limited?
Thus, a second question left unanswered is why the majority’s test
proscribes only those employer actions that well might have dissuaded a
reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.188 Under the majority’s test, “employer conduct that
causes harm to an employee is permitted” as long as the “conduct is not
so severe as to dissuade a reasonable employee from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.”189 In other words, consistent with
Burlington, an employer can retaliate against an employee who makes or
supports a charge of discrimination. The employer simply has to limit its
retaliatory actions to actions that would not dissuade a reasonable
employee from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.
Although it is true that the Burlington majority did not explicitly
address these first two questions, it implicitly did. One possible basis for
its “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker” standard is simply
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 2420 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 185, 187 and accompanying text.
Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2420 (Alito, J., concurring).
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its consideration of the various standards used by the circuits and its
conclusion that the “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker”
standard was the best one. Indeed, in formally adopting the standard, the
majority noted its agreement with the Seventh and District of Columbia
Circuits, which, prior to Burlington, used the “well might have dissuaded
a reasonable worker” standard.190 Another possible basis for the standard
is the majority’s effort to articulate a standard that effectively serves the
purpose of Title VII. A primary purpose of Title VII is to prevent
employers from engaging in retaliatory measures that dissuade
employees from engaging in protected conduct.191 Thus, the majority’s
standard, which proscribes actions that well might dissuade a reasonable
employee from asserting their rights, furthers that purpose. Alito
suggested that the majority’s standard does not protect all employees
who assert their rights because it proscribes only those employer actions
that well might have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.192 However, Alito’s argument is
flawed. It is true that the standard permits retaliatory conduct that is not
so severe as to dissuade a reasonable employee from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination, but such retaliatory conduct is not
contemplated by Title VII. As the majority emphasized before
articulating the standard, Title VII protects an individual not from all
retaliation, but from retaliation that results in an injury or harm.193 Thus,
if the standard does not protect employees who assert their rights, it is
because the employees are mistaken in assuming that their “rights” have
been violated.
The majority implied as much. After it introduced the standard by
noting that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision does not protect
employees from all retaliation,194 the majority then explained its use of
the term “material” in the standard to separate significant harms, which
are proscribed by Title VII, from trivial harms, which are not. Thus, the
majority implied that its standard proscribes only those employer actions
that are severe enough to dissuade a reasonable employee from asserting
their rights because those are the only types of actions that Title VII
proscribes. In sum, although the majority did not explicitly assert a legal
basis for its adoption of the “well might have dissuaded a reasonable
worker” standard, it did offer support for it, at least by implication.

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 2415.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.
Id.
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3. What subjective factors does the objective “well might have dissuaded
a reasonable worker” standard contemplate, and how much weight
should they be given?
Unfortunately, even given the possible rationale for the majority’s
“well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker” standard, the standard
itself is vague. Thus, a third question asks about the subjective
component of the theoretically objective standard. The majority initially
stated that the standard focuses on the reactions of a “reasonable
employee” in determining whether a retaliatory action violates Title
VII’s antiretaliation provision, and explained that the standard references
the reactions of a reasonable employee because the majority believed that
the antiretaliation provision’s standard for judging harm “must be
objective.”195 The majority then explained that an objective standard
“avoids the uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a
judicial effort to determine a plaintiff’s unusual subjective feelings.”196
However, the majority then suggested that at least some of a plaintiff’s
subjective feelings are to be considered. The majority emphasized that
“context matters,” and by way of example, explained that “[a] schedule
change in an employee’s work schedule may make little difference to
many workers, but may matter enormously to a young mother with
school age children.”197
As Alito argued in his concurrence, this example suggests that the
majority’s “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker” standard does
not ask whether a retaliatory action well might have dissuaded the
average reasonable (i.e., objective) employee, laying aside all individual
characteristics, but instead, asks whether the retaliatory action well might
have dissuaded a reasonable employee who shares at least some of the
retaliation victim’s individual characteristics.198 This example alone
introduces three individual characteristics—age, gender, and family
responsibilities—that may be appropriate characteristics for courts and
juries to consider when applying the “well might have dissuaded a
reasonable worker” standard.199 The majority suggested as much.
However, the majority said nothing with respect to how many other
characteristics may or must be considered, or what those characteristics
are.200 Nor did the majority provide any guidance for weighing any

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2421 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
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individual characteristics, including the characteristics it implicitly
recognized in its example. It said nothing of how strong the subjective
component of its objective test is. Given this lack of clarity, courts will
have to address the issue case by case.
However, courts have at least one example to reference in deciding
the issue. Since the majority recognized that a schedule change may
matter enormously to a young mother with school age children, it
implicitly recognized that consideration should be given to an
employee’s age, gender, and family responsibilities. Moreover, it implied
that the weight to be given those subjective factors, at least when
considered together, is substantial. That is, the three subjective factors
distinguishing the young mother from other employees, added together,
were enough for the court to suggest that a schedule change for her could
dissuade her from asserting her rights. That determination, in turn, would
satisfy the new standard. Thus, although the majority did not enumerate
the subjective factors that may or must be considered in applying the
“well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker” standard, or state how
the factors should be weighed, it did provide at least some guidance.

4. What does “well” mean?
The admittedly vague “well might have dissuaded a reasonable
worker” standard poses at least one more question: what does “well”
mean? As Alito argued, the majority’s use of the terms “well might have
dissuaded” introduces a “loose and unfamiliar causation standard . . . . in
an area of law in which standards of causation are already complex.”201
The standard says only that a plaintiff must show that the challenged
action well might have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination. It does not say what “well” means.
Thus, it is unclear how probable it must be that the challenged retaliatory
action would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination for the action to constitute
retaliation.
Again, although the majority did not explicitly address this issue, it
implicitly did. Since the majority’s standard is designed to distinguish
between trivial and significant harms, it follows that the causation
element is satisfied once a plaintiff establishes that the challenged harm
is more than trivial. Perhaps the question is not as much a question of
probability as it is a question of classification. If the asserted harm can be

201. Id.
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classified as trivial, the causation element cannot be satisfied because the
harm cannot be severe enough to sufficiently dissuade a reasonable
worker from reporting it. On the other hand, if the harm can be classified
as significant, it automatically satisfies the causation element because it
is, by definition, severe enough to dissuade a reasonable worker from
reporting it. Thus, by providing guidance for distinguishing between
trivial and significant harms—by requiring that the challenged action be
materially adverse—the majority simultaneously provided guidance for
determining whether causation is satisfied.
In sum, even though Burlington’s answers raise some questions,
some answers to those questions can be drawn from the majority’s
opinion. Thus, the questions may not be as problematic as they may
seem.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision in Burlington provided a resolution to the
disagreement among the circuits regarding the proper standard of
retaliation. Although its resolution is not free of complications, it is
significant, and it is progress.
Prior to Burlington, the success of a plaintiff’s retaliation case didn’t
depend as much on its facts as on the circuit that heard it. Burlington
largely fixed that because it created a uniform standard of retaliation.
And, arguably, it created a better standard than those used by some of the
circuits prior to Burlington. This is almost certainly true with respect to
the standard applied in the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. To be sure,
Burlington fixed at least two flaws in their ultimate employment decision
standard.
First, prior to Burlington, plaintiffs in these circuits had to show that
the challenged employer actions resulted in an ultimate employment
decision. Accordingly, employers could effectively retaliate against
employees by engaging in whatever adverse actions they wished, so long
as none of them amounted to an ultimate employment decision.
Burlington fixed that. Plaintiffs no longer have to show that the
retaliatory actions resulted in an ultimate employment decision.
Second, prior to Burlington, some circuits did not recognize hostile
work environment as a separate basis for retaliation. As a result,
employers could respond to an employee’s assertion of Title VII rights
by creating a hostile work environment. Burlington fixed that as well.
Now, as long as an employee can show that the creation of a hostile work
environment well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination, they can use hostile
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work environment harassment as a separate basis for retaliation,
regardless of its success as a basis for discrimination.
Both of these results are consistent with Title VII’s antiretaliation
provision’s purpose to prevent employers from taking retaliatory actions
that dissuade employees from engaging in protected conduct. To the
extent that they force employers to create antiharassment policies and
effective grievance mechanisms, they are also consistent with Title VII’s
design. In sum, although the answers Burlington provided may invite
further questions, they did provide much needed clarity to retaliation law.
They provided uniformity. They provided consistency. They
provided . . . relief.
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